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5
The massacre, torture, persecution, and imprisonment of real and imag-
ined communists and sympathizers in mid-1960s Indonesia was among
the greatest state-sponsored atrocities of the twentieth century and yet re-
mains little known and even less understood outside Indonesia. An elab-
10orate mythology about the supposed communist coup attempt of
September 1965 was foundational to the military government’s legiti-
macy discourses. The dead, the tortured, and the imprisoned remained
an existential threat to Indonesia’s survival according to these discourses,
and yet they could not be spoken of, or acknowledged in broader social
15discourses, without fear of retribution from the state. This article ex-
plores one attempt to break the silence surrounding the massacres and
to make visible the suffering of millions of Indonesians; it does so
through an analysis of the documentary film, The Act of Killing, in which
a number of those involved in mass murder re-enact their killings. It ex-
20plores the contribution of the film to understanding the politics of mass
murder through an interrogation of the history it purports to address
and through the methods employed by filmmaker Joshua Oppenheimer.
It concludes that while the film is a singular achievement, it fails as a po-
litical intervention aimed at deepening understanding of the mass
25killings.
On the night of September 30, 1965, the Author’s note: The author would like to
thank the many people who provided feedback and comment on earlier drafts of
this work at conferences, workshops and seminars in the UK, US and Indonesia. I
owe particular thanks to Martin Coward, Matt Davies, Kyle Grayson, David
30Mutimer and Laura Routley. IPS anonymous reviewers also provided invaluable
feedback and ideas for improving the argument and I am thankful for their
insights.that cemented the dynamics for a period of mass political violence. Real
and imagined communists and their sympathizers, one of Indonesia’s three politi-
cal modernizing streams, were purged, resulting in the deaths of somewhere be-
35tween 500,000 and 1,000,000 people and the persecution of millions more (see
Cribb [2001]). The killing, carried out by army special forces, militia, and other
social groups, was largely completed between October 1965 and March 1966. In
the aftermath, a Western-backed military regime emerged under the presidency
of Suharto, who was to remain in office until 1998. However, the mass murder
40and persecution, despite being one of the more significant political atrocities of
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the twentieth century, remains little known outside Indonesia (see Tanter [2002],
Roosa [2016, 282–83[). No one has ever been prosecuted for their part in these
events, and no apology to those affected has been made.
In the wake of Suharto’s fall and the gradual opening and democratization of
5the Indonesian polity, there have been several attempts to begin a process of de-
bate and reflection on the events of the mid-1960s. Abdurraham Wahid,
Indonesian president from 1999 to 2001 and former head of Indonesia’s largest
Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), attempted to legalize Marxism-
Leninism as a first step in dealing with NU’s own involvement in the massacres
10but was thwarted by strong opposition to his move (Sears 2014, 206). Aging survi-
vors, who in 2005 brought a (unsuccessful) class action against all Indonesian
presidents, were harassed and intimidated by anti-communist activists. The
attorney general threatened to ban school textbooks that had been revised to pro-
vide a more balanced interpretation of the events of 1965–1966 if they did not
15adopt approved nomenclature. In 2012, a substantial investigation of the violence,
completed by the National Commission of Human Rights under the auspices of
the Indonesian parliament, became the subject of controversy after protests were
raised by an important Islamic organization (McGregor 2016, 252–54). More re-
cently, toward the end of his second (and final) term in office, President Susilo
20Bambang Yudhoyono was widely expected to make an apology for the massacres
as part of his independence day address in August 2012. Again, under extensive
pressure from anti-communist groups, such plans were quietly shelved (McGregor
2014, 191). These abandoned attempts to address the mass violence of the mid-
1960s tend to confirm Vanessa Hearman’s observation that victims have a code of
25silence imposed upon them, but such silences are not gaps in communication;
rather, they are “social products with particular genealogies, in this case ‘the cul-
tural work of the state’ in managing both history and representation of the 1965
events” (Hearman 2014, 174).
It is the inability of those affected by persecution to speak of their own reality
30that prompted Joshua Oppenheimer to make The Act of Killing (henceforth
TAOK) (2012). The documentary has prompted debate among Indonesians,1
brought awareness of the massacres to a wider international audience than was
hitherto the case, and provoked a great deal of commentary about the merits of
the film in Indonesian studies circles. The key dramatic device in TAOK is
35Oppenheimer’s choice (largely of necessity, given that he was routinely stymied in
his attempts to focus on victims and survivors of the massacres and persecution)
to focus the film on the perpetrators of the killings. The affective impact of the
film arises from the boastful re-enactments of the killings that Oppenheimer facil-
itates. That is, the killers he engages with willingly discuss their crimes and recre-
40ate them through a range of genre films they make within the documentary itself.
Viewers watch as former perpetrators of mass murder re-enact their activities in
noir, Western, supernatural, and gangster genres. The result is a stunning docu-
mentary achievement on the part of Oppenheimer, but one is left with significant
anxieties, not just about the braggadocio of the killers but about Oppenheimer’s
45presentation of a political history rather more complex than he permits viewers to
see.
This article undertakes several tasks. First, it interrogates the idea that there was
a broad silence around the killings in mid-1960s Indonesia, and looks in particu-
lar at claims that there was no international media coverage at the time of the
50massacres. In this case, silence does not equate with an absence of reportage but
rather is a silence born of contempt for the victims. Second, I aim to analyze
1After a controlled release that was designed to defeat likely banning by censors in Indonesia, Oppenheimer
made the film freely available to Indonesians on YouTube on September 30, 2013. As of November 2016, the film
has had just under one million viewings.
2 Performing Mass Murder: Constructing the Perpetrator in Documentary Film
TAOK as an artifact that is concerned with explanation of mass murder. An exam-
ination of how, if at all, the film contributes insight into mass killing will be un-
dertaken with reference to the ambitions of cine´ma-ve´rite´, given that
Oppenheimer has likened his documentary practice to one of the founders of the
5genre, Jean Rouch. The commitment to exposing hidden truths goes a long way
to explaining Oppenheimer’s psychological profile of his key interlocutor, Anwar
Congo. Third, Oppenheimer has been explicit that his film is to be understood as
a direct provocation, not just to Indonesians but to Western governments and
other allies of the Suharto regime to acknowledge and apologize for the killings and
10persecution. Oppenheimer presents an unreformed Indonesian state in which the
heirs to the mass murderers have secured the state against claims for recognition
and even reparation, while some surviving killers are publicly celebrated for saving
the nation from communism. In this Indonesia, attempts to broach the atrocities
continue to face hostile resistance underpinned by a deep state consensus.
15My conclusions are ambivalent. The film as a documentary artifact is a singular
achievement, perhaps unique. While it forms part of a recent trend to delve into
mass killing from the perspective of perpetrators, it is difficult to assess whether
viewers can get much beyond the unreconstructed conduct of the killers they meet
in the film. This has important consequences for how viewers unfamiliar with
20Indonesia may come to view the country. Arguably, any appreciation of Indonesia
that is based on lazy approaches to the ways the Islamic other is encountered may
simply have such prejudices confirmed by the film. Ultimately, I conclude that the
film fails as a meaningful political intervention, not because it blunders in present-
ing mass killing as ordinary, but because it evacuates politics from its account of the
25events of 1965–1966. This is a flaw that greatly undermines the film, in my view.
The Invisible Genocide: The Indonesian Mass Killings and Media Coverage
In Indonesian and (to a lesser extent) genocide studies, there are ongoing de-
bates about the massacres in Indonesia and why they are so little known outside
Indonesia (Roosa 2016, 283). Arguably, because Indonesia’s post-massacre mili-
30tary regime aligned itself to the anti-communist Cold War cause and opened its
doors to Western foreign investment, the manner of its emergence was largely un-
remarked by Western governments (McGregor 2016, 244). There was very little
sympathy for massacred communists at a time when the United States and its
allies were rapidly escalating the war in Vietnam, which itself contributed to highly
35negative perceptions of communism and communists in the West. Asian commu-
nists were very likely beyond the pale in much the same way that loathing of the
Japanese was explicitly intensified through a racial logic in the lead-up to WWII
(Tapsell 2008, 213–15; Porter 2009, 50; McGregor 2014, 189).
That the murdered were often poor, rural people, as well as allegedly commu-
40nist, perhaps goes some way to explaining the lack of interest in Western polities.
But at least some intelligence agencies and government departments were atten-
tive and had a grasp on events. The Australian PM, Harold Holt, knew enough of
them to be able to joke in New York in July 1966 that “With around 100,000 com-
munist sympathizers being knocked off, I think it is safe to say a re-orientation has
45taken place.” Interestingly, while Tapsell cites a number of 100,000, it would ap-
pear that Holt actually said 500,000 to 1,000,000, suggesting that he had very
good information even though the killings were only just winding down at the
time he addressed his audience (see, for example, Tanter [2002]). Time magazine
opined that the physical liquidation of the PKI was “the West’s best news in Asia
50for years” (Tapsell 2008, 223).
And yet the extent to which the massacres were reported in, for example, the
Australian media remains contested. Tapsell notes that Australian journalists of
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the time argued that the problem with reporting on the mass killings was practi-
cal. That is:
They argue that the limited news coverage of the killings at the time arose because
of the practical difficulties that they encountered on the ground, rather than any
5failure of objectivity on their part. The constraints which prevented a more exten-
sive coverage were not due to the ideological nature of the press, nor a product of
government pressure. (Tapsell 2008, 218)
Relying on memoirs and interviews he conducted with retired journalists, Tapsell
notes that all claimed it was difficult to report on the massacres because physical
10evidence of them was hard to find. Some journalists saw a few bodies here and
there, but nothing on the scale that would enable them to report massacres.
Moreover, Indonesian witnesses to the massacres remained fearfully silent and
were reluctant to speak to journalists. Journalists themselves were subjected to in-
timidating treatment that made them fear for their own safety and that of their in-
15formers in the event they reported contentious stories (Tapsell 2008, 218–19).
But Tapsell also notes that the memoirs of journalists who were in Indonesia at
the time of the killings, some published just after the events and some much
more recently, are notable for the far greater detail that they go into about the
massacres when compared to their reporting of the time. In each case, journalists
20claim that their memoirs are based on information they gathered while in
Indonesia and not on material that subsequently came to their attention (Tapsell
2008, 220–21). The discrepancy speaks interestingly to the problems not only of
memory but the tensions between bearing witness, professional conduct, and cor-
porate responsibility.
25In an earlier article, Richard Tanter presented an alternative account of report-
age from Indonesia during the massacres. Tanter reviewed each edition of two
newspapers from Harold Holt’s home city of Melbourne for eleven months from
October 1, 1965: the Sun-Herald, at the popular end of reportage, and the broad-
sheet journal of record, The Age. In both, Tanter finds almost daily accounts of
30Indonesia but across that eleven months only a few articles that directly mention
the killings. In the main, even when obliquely referenced, the violence occurred
in the passive voice and with no obvious agents (“the violence which swept
Indonesia . . . which resulted in the death of thousands, perhaps hundreds of
thousands”). When this pattern was broken with comments about fanatical
35Muslims running amok in a state of blood lust, the well-established pattern in the
Australian media of reporting Indonesia as bizarre, dangerous, unbalanced, irra-
tional, and violent was reinforced (Tanter 2002). Tanter concludes that the
silence in the Australian media about the mass murder “is the point where anti-
communism, the demands of the national security state, and . . . a deep measure
40of racism, fused to smother and then sever the connection to a shared humanity
and moral responsibility”(Tanter 2002). On this reading, journalists, editors, and
media owners took it upon themselves to protect their readers from the need to
confront the political and moral questions arising from the genocide being un-
dertaken in Australia’s second-nearest neighbor (Tanter 2002).
45Karim Najjarine and Drew Cottle (2003) reach similar conclusions in their anal-
ysis of the interaction between the Australian Broadcasting Commission’s Radio
Australia, the Department of External Affairs, and senior Australian diplomatic of-
ficials in Indonesia. They note a history of tension between the Department of
External Affairs and Radio Australia as broadcasts into Indonesia became more
50critical in the wake of the coup attempt. In ongoing efforts to frame events in
Indonesia, the Australian ambassador provided narrative “advice” to Radio
Australia as to the preferred content and tone of its broadcasts. Najjarine and
Cottle argue that “Australian information policy towards Indonesia in the months
following the attempted coup was ideologically directed and designed to assist the
4 Performing Mass Murder: Constructing the Perpetrator in Documentary Film
Army under General Suharto to assume power throughout the country.” Indeed,
the Department of External Affairs unsuccessfully endeavored to bring Radio
Australia under its control (Najjarine and Cottle 2003, 53–55).
Benedict Anderson notes that, in the last months of 1965, American journalists
5framed the conflict as a popular fury unleashed by the supposed bestiality of the
PKI and described a vengeful, primitive population that had run amok. “The mili-
tary’s propagandists employed this idea, describing the Army’s role as curbing
and calming down this wave of ‘spontaneous’ popular violence.” However, such
an approach ignores the evidence that the killing can be mapped onto the move-
10ment of red beret wearing commandos from one place to another (Anderson
2012, 281–82). The West German press also enthusiastically welcomed the mass vi-
olence and uncritically accepted the Indonesian army’s version of events
(Schaefer 2013, 101). In 1966, the French liberal daily Le Monde presented the
emerging Suharto as a selfless patriot and so conformed to the widespread view
15that the military was a force for stabilization and rationality (see Schu¨tte [2013]).
However, there are other contributing factors to knowledge of the massacres
being limited beyond Indonesia. First, much of the killing was carried out secre-
tively. John Roosa argues that the killings took place at night in secret locations
and, as such, perpetrators, military and militia, understood they were engaged in
20clandestine work. The army leadership did not publicly speak of the killings.
There was little or no reporting of the massacres in the Indonesian media. These
factors helped make it clear that the killing should not enter the public record
(Roosa 2014, 179; 2016, 290). Second, the Indonesian state continues to suppress
public discussion of these events. When the massacres are raised, the state has re-
25sorted to the usual tactics of perpetrators: “minimize the number of casualties,
claim that people on both sides were equally harmed, allege the victims were the
aggressors, shift blame to other groups of perpetrators, assure everyone that noth-
ing good will come of reopening old wounds” (Roosa 2014, 179). Third, guilt for
the killing was spread as widely as possible, providing further incentives for people
30to “forget.” As is common in genocide, the authorities, in this case the Indonesian
military, ensured that as many people as possible were implicated in the killings,
which also served to force people to declare themselves for or against the commu-
nists by participating in the killings or not (Cribb 2001, 236–37). As Philip
Gourevitch, in his account of the Rwandan genocide, argues, “[i]f everyone is im-
35plicated, then implication becomes meaningless. Implication is what? A Hutu who
thought there was anything to be implicated in would have to be an accomplice
of the enemy” (Gourevitch 1999, 96).
Finally, the PKI leadership and membership was unarmed and so had no capac-
ity to defend itself once the military moved decisively against it. Nor did it have ac-
40cess to any media in which to mount a narrative counteroffensive that challenged
the version of events laying the blame for the murder of the generals at the feet
of the party. Hundreds of thousands of PKI members, followers, and affiliates
went with little resistance to their deaths, in keeping with their “abject powerless-
ness” (Oppenheimer and Uwemedimo 2009, 94). Indeed, Robert Cribb argues
45that passivity in the face of death is not uncommon in genocides and that in the
Indonesian case there were reports of victims in North Sumatra forming “long, ac-
quiescent lines at a river’s edge while they awaited to be decapitated” (Cribb
2001, 233).
The problem of PKI passivity is complicated by its relationship to the question of
50guilt. Some observers have argued that passivity implied acknowledgement of guilt,
and have suggested the meekness in the face of destruction was the party’s admis-
sion that it had erred. The party, of course, was neatly pinned in a no-win situation
by this kind of argument: if it did not fight, it acknowledged its guilt, if it did fight,
then its guilt was proven. Passivity is so frequently reported in stories of the
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Indonesian massacres that it probably was indeed the typical response of victims,
but the most plausible explanation is that victims were paralysed by that combina-
tion of uncertainty and vague hope which makes acquiescence right until the very
last moment always seem wiser than resistance. (Cribb 1990, 35)
5These are among the factors that explain why the massacres are little known out-
side Indonesia and the long official silence within Indonesia. There was little sym-
pathetic reportage in the liberal Western media, and in the atmospherics of the
Cold War little incentive for media consumers to delve more deeply into what re-
porting there was. The lack of acknowledgment, accountability, and prosecutions
10means that perpetrators continue to live freely among survivors and their families.
It is this impunity that motivated Joshua Oppenheimer to make his unique film.
The Genocide Film/Documentary: Film as a Medium
The Nazi Holocaust has generated an enormous number of documentary and
popular cinematic accounts of mid-twentieth-century German mechanized mass
15murder. While documentary accounts such as Night and Fog (1955) and Shoah
(1985) (possibly the two most highly regarded documentary accounts of Nazi pol-
icy) are somber, confronting, and chilling in their portrayal of the intellectual ra-
tionale and practical policy outcomes of the planned extermination of Europe’s
Jews and others the German regime persecuted, at least some of the tens of other
20cinematic accounts of these events are presented as entertainment, even (black)
comedy: Life Is Beautiful (1997) and Inglourious Basterds (2009).
More recently, popular cinema has turned its attention to a portrayal of the be-
nighted events of Rwanda in the mid-1990s. Films like Shooting Dogs (2006) and
Hotel Rwanda (2004) reduce the Rwandan genocide to a series of personal trage-
25dies played out in circumstances of unfathomable morality. These two films also
recount actual events and, in the case of the former, makes use of survivors in mi-
nor acting roles and as production crew, and is filmed on location. Told from the
point of view of the victims and those aiding them, these films invite a shocked re-
sponse on the part of the viewer and channel one’s empathy to the victims of
30mass slaughter and other genocidal acts. These films and others, such as
Schindler’s List (1993) or The Pianist (2002), provide a space “where viewers can
leave the theatre having shed a cathartic tear, feeling their emotional response
equivalent to having ‘gained awareness’ or ‘done something’ about genocide”
(Dwyer 2014, 183–84). As Brown and Rafter argue, such cinematic offerings com-
35monly invoke “genocidal background contexts to create sweeping, often melodra-
matic narratives with sweeping conclusions that neatly rework the past into a
more comforting present” (Brown and Rafter 2013, 1019). In replaying particular
genocidal events that supposedly provide an experience of them to the viewer,
such films adopt simple narrative structures of heroes and villains, reconciliation
40and recuperation, closure and justice. Atrocity is assigned to memory and history,
and viewers are comforted with the idea that these events are locked in a remote
past, making the present both bearable and free of the need for interrogation of
genocide (Brown and Rafter 2013, 1020). Sylvia Tiwon’s concerns run yet deeper.
Discussing the lynching of African Americans, she argues that aestheticizing pub-
45lic forms of violence in the visual arts has led to the commercialization of atrocity
and created a safe space of aesthetic distance between the atrocity and the be-
holder. On this view, the victim of racial violence is transformed into an aesthetic
object and, so, a locus that generates white subjectivity (Tiwon 2014, 201). In a
different context, Walter Benjamin complained of how certain artistic, literary,
50and photographic traditions turned political struggle from a compelling motive
for decision into an object of comfortable contemplation (see Carrabine [2012,
477]). The same might be said of commercially oriented genocide films.
6 Performing Mass Murder: Constructing the Perpetrator in Documentary Film
Prior to the turn of the twenty-first century, only a minimal number of docu-
mentaries dealt with perpetrators of mass murder. These include The Eichmann
Trial (1961), Hotel Terminus (1988) (Klaus Barbie), The Specialist (1999) (Adolf
Eichmann), and parts of Shoah (1985). But since the millennium there have been
5many more, including a number that examine the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
(Nichols 2014, 81). There are some common themes in these films that, for my
purposes, include important questions: How can terrible crimes be shown and dis-
cussed in ways that are not exploitative of victims and voyeuristic on the part of
the viewer? How can the remorse and trauma of perpetrators and victims be ex-
10plored ethically and in ways that might contribute to reconciliation? How can the
crimes of perpetrators be represented in documentaries in ways that blur the sim-
ple binary between perpetrator and victim? How can we understand the relation-
ship between individual perpetrator and the role of the state or other authority
that both author and authorize mass murder?
15Arguably, the documentary, or what one of its founders, John Grierson, fa-
mously described as “the creative treatment of actuality,” is the form that has the
most to offer in coming to terms with, and better understanding, the dynamics
that lead to mass murder in a given polity (Hardy 1966, 13). Brown and Rafter ar-
gue that visual accounts of genocide are not just unavoidable given the ubiquity
20of the image in contemporary culture, but that some genocide films provide an
opportunity to analyze and interrogate the “meanings that will enter collective
memory and historical consciousness” (Brown and Rafter 2013, 1019). Critical,
documentary accounts in particular, wrestle with issues of ethical representation,
strive for ambivalence, resist premature closure, and seek to disorient their audi-
25ences such that the potential for transition from spectatorship to witness may be
realized (Brown and Rafter 2013, 1020). There is, though, nothing inevitable
about the power of documentary film to fulfill these ambitions, despite the heavy
burden of expectation for transformation that resides in the practice (Torchu in
Brown and Rafter [2013, 1019–20]).
30There have been very many approaches to genocide in film, including anima-
tion, which Brian Winston argues has enormous possibilities because there is “no
journalistic subterfuge of transparency, no voyeurism and, positively, of course it
allows the visualisation of . . . the ‘unreachable’” (Winston 2012, 114). Genocide
documentaries are largely located in the truth-telling or truth-seeking practices of
35archival research, testimony collection and analysis, photojournalism, and investi-
gative reportage (Brown and Rafter 2013, 1020). However, it is important to rec-
ognize the limits of this kind of approach to documentary film. Citing Derrida,
Michael Renov argues:
One of the dreams of positivism in the human sciences is the distinction, even the
40opposition, between interpretation—subjective, vulnerable, ultimately arbitrary—
and description, a certain and definitive activity. (Renov 1993, 13)
Not only are the formal practices within documentary film-making historically
and politically contingent, the very practice itself is highly politicized and as such
the texts it produces are as open to interrogation as any. (Renov 1993, 19, 16)
45Bill Nichols describes it as follows:
documentaries were always forms of re-presentation, never clear windows on to “re-
ality”; the film-maker was always a participant-witness and an active fabricator of
meaning, a producer of cinematic discourse rather than a neutral or all-knowing re-
porter of the way things really are. (Nichols 1983, 18)
50Indeed, Michael Renov approvingly cites Clifford Geertz, who observed of his own
anthropological practice that he never got anywhere near the bottom of anything
he researched. Cultural analysis, observed Geertz, “is intrinsically incomplete.” If
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this is true of the scholar, asks Renov, how much more so for the documentarist
who must adapt to the “contours of the cultural marketplace and a capital-
intensive mode of production”? (Renov 1993, 30–31).
Debates concerning objectivity, its desirability as an ambition, and how to
5achieve it have been fundamental to the development of documentary film prac-
tice from its earliest days. Cine´ma-ve´rite´, observational cinema, and direct cinema
have all been profoundly concerned with the relationship between the subjects
and subject of filmmaking and filmmaker. Debates on the question of objectivity
have been notably sharp. For example, Emile de Antonio observed:
10Cine´ma ve´rite´ is . . . a lie . . . a childish assumption about the nature of film. Cine´ma
ve´rite´ is a joke. Only people without feelings or convictions could even think of mak-
ing cine´ma ve´rite´. I happen to have strong feelings and some dreams and my preju-
dice is under and in everything I do. (de Antonio in Bruzzi [2006, 67])
It is around issues of objectivity that documentary film perhaps departs from pho-
15tojournalism in important ways. While documentary filmmakers and photojour-
nalists are similarly anchored in the socio-political context in which they work,
they may address different aspects of audience curiosity and expectation. For ex-
ample, writing of photography, Susie Linfield argues that “we” do not turn to pho-
tography for understanding and solutions to entrenched problems but for glimp-
20ses of what a range of human emotions and actions, including political violence,
look like. “We” turn to photographs to explore our own intuitive reactions. “We”
“approach photographs, first and foremost, through emotions” (Linfield 2010,
22). Despite the caveats offered above, documentary filmmaking differs from pho-
tography in that it is concerned to relay something of the world as it is or was and
25often to challenge settled understandings of particular issues. If, as Brown and
Rafter (2013) claim, genocide is “the crime of crimes,” then arguably the burden
on filmmakers is particularly heavy as they navigate the tensions between, effec-
tively, storytelling and respectful, ethical, sensitive relating of the events to which
they refer. While it is not the primary purpose of this particular research to ex-
30plore in depth the history of documentary film’s genres and developments (and
the development of documentary film practice is as much related to technological
development as social change), I do want to acknowledge that the documentarist
of genocide should be as free to explore his or her material as any other film-
maker. Indeed, it may be that mass killing, in both its ordinariness and its margin-
35ality to the human condition, demands of documentary particularly creative and
innovative approaches to make strange its ordinariness and make ordinary its ex-
tremes. For, as Bill Nichols notes, “perpetrators are not the psychopaths of much
popular culture . . . [t]hey learn to commit atrocities and come to accept them as
either the byproduct of a broader, legitimate task . . . or as the fulfilment of their
40dedication and belief” (Nichols 2014, 82).
However, convention busting in genocide documentaries is difficult. As Vanessa
Hearman notes, with respect to expectations of advocacy created by such films:
The “audiovisual testimonial scene” is one of the most common and geopolitically
significant venues for the “attestation, mitigation and reception of social suffering”
45. . . The presence of the “talking head” suggests authenticity and at the same time en-
ables us, the audience, to respond to this suffering. (Hearman 2014, 172)
The burden on survivors is magnified in some circumstances by the absence of
any other visual testimony. For example, Winston notes the clandestine, unre-
corded, un-filmed rampage of Nazi forces in Latvia in 1941–1942, during which a
50killing occurred every thirty seconds for fifteen months or so, but of which there
is almost no photographic or cinematic record. What images do exist are tasked
with “having to meet the standards of criminal evidential truth” (Winston 2012,
98–99).
8 Performing Mass Murder: Constructing the Perpetrator in Documentary Film
Renov suggests there are four tendencies in documentary filmmaking: 1) to re-
cord, reveal, or preserve; 2) to persuade or promote; 3) to analyze or interrogate;
4) to express (Renov 1993, 21). The tendencies are not in themselves mutually ex-
clusive. To record, reveal, or preserve is the most elemental of impulses within
5documentary filmmaking and is to be found at the very origins of the practice. It
is “the creation of a second-order reality cut to the measure of our desire” (Renov
1993, 25). Persuasion is the mode of filmmaking with its genealogy in the work of
John Grierson, polemical and activist, with the film a hammer to shape and
change the (political) issues that it addresses (Renov 1993, 29). Citing Brecht,
10Renov notes that the measure of an artwork is its capacity to activate audiences.
Thus, analysis entails revelation interrogated. Recognizing that mediational
structures do more than provide pleasing aesthetics, films that make explicit
their own processes are more “likely to engender the healthy skepticism that be-
gets knowledge, offering itself as a model” (Renov 1993, 30–31). The expressive
15is the aesthetic dimension in documentary filmmaking, which is as common as it
is undervalued. Work that innovates or challenges should in no way be removed
from serious consideration as a documentary, according to Renov, who argues
that “the communicative aim is frequently enhanced by attention to the expres-
sive dimension” (Renov 1993, 32, 35).
20Night and Fog and Shoah, the two genocide documentaries most widely recog-
nized for setting genre conventions, approach the same genocide in different
ways. In the former film, director Alain Resnais establishes a jarring visual econ-
omy of contrasts between the camps as they were when in use and as he found
them in 1955, abandoned, being reclaimed by nature and occasionally bathed in
25weak sunshine. The innovation of industrialized slaughter required of Resnais a
corresponding novelty in his approach to documenting atrocity. This was
achieved through the juxtaposition of images of horror and the ordinary,
achieved through radical approaches to montage, disorientation, camera move-
ments, and a counterpointed commentary to produce a film of warnings, haunt-
30ings, existential anxiety, and terror (Brown and Rafter 2013, 1021). Ominous and
aesthetically rich, the film leads the viewer to a “comprehension of the incom-
mensurable” through its combination of image selection, spoken word, choice of
musical approach and camera work (Renov 1993, 30). Widely admired and under-
stood as path-breaking though the film is, it may have established conventions so
35firmly as to make alternate approaches to the same subject matter challenging to
identify. Night and Fog set, in Brian Winston’s view, a certain standard of how the
crimes of the Nazis could be depicted, and this led to difficulties in breaking with
the established formula thenceforth. Having worked on Holocaust documentary
accounts himself in the mid-1980s, Winston worried about an oversimplification
40of the Holocaust to a contest between Nazis and Jews (despite Resnais never di-
rectly referencing Jews in his film) and in so doing evacuating the politics from
the industrialized policies of slaughter (and presumably other genocides).
Winston’s concern is that unquestioned conventions lead to the production of
Holocaust industry documentaries (Winston 2012, 102).
45Thirty years later, Shoah defied the conventions of Night and Fog and succeeds
partly because it eschews the liberation archive; director Claude Lanzmann
judged audiences to have been anaesthetized by such images (Brown and Rafter
2013, 1022). They had become, in his view, Holocaust wallpaper, their affective ca-
pacity leached (Winston 2012, 100). Lanzmann instead draws upon the power of
50the testimony of victims, perpetrators, and bystanders to achieve the force of his
film. Concerned about the inability of the purely visual to capture the nature of
what happened in the camps, Lanzmann develops a range of other techniques
that give his testimonial approach greater effect. These include long, painful in-
terviews, the duration of the film itself (some nine and a half hours), repetition,
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rhythm, and the confronting of places and the faces and voices of survivors, per-
petrators, and those marginally involved to bring the experiences recounted into
a present that cannot or has not processed them (Brown and Rafter 2013,
1022–23). Lanzmann also includes the testimony of perpetrators in his film, in-
5terviews often obtained through the artifice of a hidden camera, and it is this
component of Shoah that most explicitly links it to the TAOK.
The Act of Killing (TAOK)
Despite being little remembered outside Indonesia, the massacres of the mid-
1960s are constitutive of the contemporary Indonesian state. Suharto’s New
10Order arose from the elimination of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI),
which it argued was responsible for the political and economic chaos that pre-
ceded the great crackdown. There has been no apology for what happened, no
reconciliation between the antagonists, no truth commissions, and no prosecu-
tions. Indeed, as Gerry van Klinken argues: “Indonesia’s most intractable political
15problem today is the strength of commitment within the ‘deep state’ to the vio-
lent suppression of dissident views” (van Klinken 2014, 177).
“Dissident views” took many different forms during the Suharto era, but the re-
gime discursively worked the idea of “threat” into the very core of its diligent and
authoritarian maintenance of order. Islamic radicals, liberal moderates, social
20democrats, and separatists were all regarded with suspicion and frequently dealt
with violently, but it was the potential return of communism that the New Order
repeatedly ventriloquized to justify the need for endless vigilance. It produced
and reproduced the threat of communism throughout the thirty-two years of the
Suharto presidency (see McGregor [2016]). On Leslie Dwyer’s reading, the New
25Order government’s official narrative that it saved the nation from communism is
“a brutal fiction secured by a vicious erasure of state violence” (Dwyer 2014, 184).
However, since the fall of Suharto there has also been an enormous proliferation
of media, in a wide variety of formats, operating with a great deal more freedom
than was the case during the New Order years. Activists, filmmakers, and novelists
30have taken advantage of this new, if uncertain, openness to explore the events of
1965–1966 albeit without, as yet, much insight into the politics of the PKI. Such
space has even led to the production of a number of respected documentary films
dealing with the massacres (McGregor 2016, 252–53). However, the extent and ef-
fectiveness of the debate they have generated remains unclear. In Heryanto’s
35view, this is because such films, devoted as they are to the personal experiences of
older, frail, frightened people in “talking heads” formats, are of little interest to
younger Indonesians who have only sketchy knowledge of, and little interest in,
the massacres (Heryanto 2012, 226–28). However, more recently, interest in, and
concern about, the massacres has grown. Activists, researchers, artists, filmmakers,
40and novelists continue to be intimidated, but increasing numbers of Indonesians
are reviewing their knowledge of the killings as more information and interpreta-
tion becomes publicly available (see Roosa [2016]). Beyond Indonesia, an
International People’s Tribunal was held November 10–13, 2015, at The Hague,
to develop an accurate record of the killings and to examine evidence for whether
45crimes against humanity were committed (Sekretariat 2016).
Joshua Oppenheimer plays a part in extending awareness of these traumatic
events by confronting the silences surrounding the massacres and their long-
term effects on the Indonesian polity. His initial ambition to make a film
about survivors living among perpetrators of violence was thwarted, as at-
50tempts to interview and film people were routinely disrupted by local people
opposed to his project, by police, by militia and other shadowy forces (van
Munster and Sylvest 2015, 204). On the verge of abandoning his film,
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Oppenheimer was advised by an Indonesian colleague to refocus his efforts
on the exploits of perpetrators. Oppenheimer approached this task with little
optimism, believing that few, if any, perpetrators would openly canvass their
crimes. However, he found many were more than willing to discuss their past
5activities and not least because they perceived themselves as having engaged
in heroic action to save the nation from the scourge of communism (van
Munster and Sylvest 2015, 204).
Oppenheimer challenges many of the conventions of genocide films in two
principal ways. First, he exclusively focuses on perpetrators who willingly discuss
10their involvement in killing large numbers of people accused of being commu-
nists. Second, Oppenheimer facilitates the confessions of his interlocutors by
enabling them to demonstrate their killings. This leads to a small group of them
re-enacting their killings in the mode of Hollywood genre films: Western, film
noir, gangster, supernatural thrillers. The film centers primarily on Anwar Congo,
15an older man of unspecified age who, early in the film, quite cheerfully confesses
to having murdered in excess of a thousand people and, equally happily, demon-
strates the garroting technique that he used to ensure that he kept his clothes
and person clean and free of blood. As the film unfolds, we see Congo moving
around the Northern Sumatran city of Medan, where he is both a minor celebrity
20and clearly associated with a militia group and thugs who extort money from
Chinese shopkeepers in a local market. It is not clear whether his celebrity arises
from his former activities (though given that we see him interviewed on a local
television chat show about his killing, it may well be so) or from his notoriety be-
cause of his gang and militia activities.
25On my reading of the film, Oppenheimer is not only aware of the very obvious
political constraints that so complicated his filmmaking attempts, but sensitive to
the difficulties of having perpetrators speak of their crimes in a straightforward,
descriptive fashion. One wonders if this is why Oppenheimer resorts to sublima-
tion as his primary technique. Mary Zurbuchen suggests of the Indonesian survi-
30vors that it is difficult, risky, and complex for them to attempt to recount the past.
Those “‘who have survived traumatic experiences may be unable or unwilling to
express themselves,’ even in the ideal circumstances of liberalism” (Heryanto
2012, 233). Is it possible the same is true of perpetrators and that what we witness
in the film is the provision of a unique language in which to speak the ineffable?
35Like Lanzmann, Oppenheimer does not use any footage depicting the events
themselves (none is known to exist),2 but unlike Lanzmann, who relies primarily
on witness and participant testimony, Oppenheimer creatively transgresses the
boundary between objectivism and the composition of a poetic fiction about the
massacres (Heryanto 2014, 163). In this respect at least, Oppenheimer may be in
40accordance with Paul Tickell’s views about the limits of realism’s capacity to de-
pict what, for many victims (and perpetrators), may remain unspeakable (see
Tickell [1993]).
There is no doubt that having the perpetrators making films within the docu-
mentary is highly innovative, if not unique. But there are other issues about
45Oppenheimer’s mise-en-sce`ne that require reflection. From time to time, and espe-
cially toward the end of the film when it seems that Congo is in the throes of sig-
nificant moral discomfort about his earlier activities, Congo addresses
Oppenheimer, by name, in direct-to-camera addresses. Indeed, with
Oppenheimer off camera, the effect of Congo looking unequivocally into the lens
50creates the effect of him speaking to us as audience, spectators, viewers, and per-
haps voyeurs. In his reflections upon his actions of a half century ago and what
may be current introspection, the film partly humanizes Congo and provokes a
2John Roosa notes that no photographs of the massacres are known to exist, and so it is equally unlikely that
there is moving footage of the executions (Roosa 2016, 283).
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degree of empathy for him as we watch him struggle with his conscience.
Oppenheimer’s most forceful intervention comes late in the film when Congo
claims, after acting out a scene where he is tortured for being an alleged commu-
nist, that he finally understands and has empathy for those that he himself brutal-
5ized and murdered. It is at this point that Oppenheimer expresses his disbelief
that Congo can have experienced anything like the terror of his victims. It is as if
at this juncture Oppenheimer is anxious not to let the empathy of the viewer too
readily rehabilitate Congo.
Herein lies a powerful tension in TAOK. On the one hand, the film proffers a
10psychological examination of Congo and others engaged in past killing and con-
temporary thuggery. However, in comparing his work to that of Jean Rouch,
Oppenheimer argues that the purpose of documentary is not to attempt an objec-
tive account of particular events, but to enter into a performance with one’s inter-
locutor(s), such that the subject of the film may say or do something that s/he
15may not say or do to the same degree without the presence of the camera. That
is, to turn on a camera is to film a performance in which the director is a collabo-
rator. The performance is jointly owned by subject(s) and director in that rushes
are shared between filmmaker and subject while, of course, overall editorial con-
trol remains with the director. Invoking his interest in theoretical physics,
20Oppenheimer argues that observing disturbs the nature of the observed and the
filmmaker, like the physicist, must accept that s/he deals with a crisis of objectiv-
ity. There is no single reality that the filmmaker seeks to uncover but rather an al-
most innumerable number of fragmentary molecular interacting fantasies, stories,
narratives, and fictions (van Munster and Sylvest 2015, 201–3). As such, his ac-
25count of Congo somewhat hesitantly attempts to frame Congo’s reality on its own
terms, resisting the simple step of moral condemnation (despite Oppenheimer’s
protestation when Congo professes an affective experience of the communist
other when having mock violence enacted upon him).
On the other hand, when viewed as an aesthetic rather than psychological sub-
30ject, Congo presents in a significantly different light. Here is where
Oppenheimer’s stated claim that he resists the temptation to make Congo differ-
ent, to put distance between himself and the murderer, is less persuasive. On
Mike Shapiro’s account it is not the inner motivations of subjects that should be
the focus of analysis when viewing a film such as TAOK, but their capacity as aes-
35thetic subjects whose movements and actions reveal much about the world they
inhabit and create (Shapiro 2013, 11). Thus, while Oppenheimer creates a great
deal of ambiguity about Congo’s psychic state, no such ambivalence pertains re-
garding the Indonesia of which Congo, his fellow murderers and thugs, and their
supporters in different sectors and tiers of Indonesian society, have created from
40the events of 1965–1966. In this Indonesia, Congo and his collaborators move bra-
zenly around the world they were midwives to with their killings. They extort
money from Chinese shopkeepers, visit the offices of local media owners and se-
nior regional politicians. They appear on television to relive and share their expe-
riences of killing through the electronic media. They perform re-enactments of
45their murders that traumatize at least some of those dragooned into these staged
events. In this Indonesia it is the “winners” who speak (a point forcefully made by
Adi Zulkadry, one of Congo’s co-killers from the 1960s), the perpetrators of
crimes who have access to various nodes of power, the unreconstructed who con-
tinue to remake Indonesia in their own image. No one else is seen or heard. In
50this Indonesia, there is no resistance, no counter-narrative, and no space of, and
for, survivors of the mass killings. As such, Oppenheimer forecloses on the possi-
bility of an aesthetic interrogation of Congo’s Indonesia and instead passes judg-
ment upon it and its stewards, seemingly choking off the possibility of that which
he seeks to initiate: acknowledgment, debate, and reform. Through his treatment
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of Congo, Oppenheimer fails to broaden the atrocity problematic per se, instead
narrowing it and intensifying the experience of the viewer to a particular moment
(Shapiro 2015, 5). For non-Indonesian viewers, that may confine the politics of
the mass killings to Indonesia. For Indonesian viewers, it perhaps unhelpfully
5entrenches the perpetrator/victim binary.
In a sense, the film helps consolidate the important idea that there is no neces-
sary relationship between revelations of crime and injustice and the truth leading
to justice. The truth does not necessarily galvanize and lead to the kind of closure
so familiar in commercially oriented productions (Heryanto 2014, 163–64).
10Rather, TAOK “works” and unsettles because it does not present viewers with the
opportunity for passive consumption of violent images, but rather confronts with
jarring juxtapositions: terror and its garish aesthetics, deadly enmity and riotous
humor, deep emotion and utter banality, and all this in the context of a halluci-
nogenic re-enactment of the killings (Dwyer 2014, 183). The film is also discomfit-
15ing precisely because it leaves the viewer with unmet expectations. The film is a
kind of advocacy on the part of those killed, but in an unaccustomed form, and
so is difficult to interpret (Hearman 2014, 174–75). Yet the film can be argued to
incorporate all four elements of Renov’s classification of documentary tendencies:
it certainly seeks to preserve the memory of the mass killings and to reveal them
20to a wider audience. It aims to persuade and promote, and in this regard has the
features of a Grierson-like documentary as hammer. It is deeply self-aware of its
expressive and communicative dimensions, but it is not as obvious that the film
openly engages with its own limited reading of Indonesian political history. That
is, it is not clear that the documentary interrogates its own revelations as honestly
25as it could. And this includes the lack of examination of Congo’s claims (Cribb
2014, 147–48).
Oppenheimer describes the film as his love letter to Indonesia and is explicit
about his ambitions for the film to generate debate among Indonesians; he hopes
that it will lead to greater openness and even an apology on the part of the state.
30The film is also concerned to expose the complicity of countries that supported
the Suharto regime and its virulent anti-communist politics, though activism of
this sort is arguably secondary to Oppenheimer’s concerns. But if the film is pri-
marily for Indonesians, its presentation of highly complex events may undermine
its credibility and utility as a tool to promote dialogue. As Laurie Sears suggests,
35while elements of the mise-en-sce`ne may appear absurdist to Euro-American audi-
ences, it may speak a very different message to Indonesians.
This is the power of film, whether documentary, blockbuster, or art film: it tells dif-
ferent stories to different audiences . . . Who was punished and who survived is am-
ply demonstrated in Oppenheimer’s film. There is a great disconnect that I fear
40gives exactly the wrong message to Indonesian audiences watching the film. (Sears
2014, 205)
Galuh Wandita endorses this concern, noting that in a country that has blamed
the victims for the atrocities of the mid-1960s, an Indonesian audience may strug-
gle to understand the use of irony in the film (Wandita 2014, 169). Many com-
45mentators, both Indonesian and other, have expressed reservations that the film
highlights the impunity with which the former killers live their lives and continue
to terrorize in the present (Cribb 2014, 148–49; Hearman 2014, 171; van Klinken
2014, 177; McGregor 2014, 189). Indeed, Ariel Heryanto argues that the film is
“an obscene testimony to the absolute impunity enjoyed by the politicos-cum-
50gangsters, who continue to run the country, nearly half a century later” (Heryanto
2014, 163). Thus, it remains an open question as to whether showing the lives of
those whose violence continues to straddle petty criminality to the crushing of dis-
sent is enabling.
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Oppenheimer’s decision to decontextualize the mass murders by focusing only
on the activities of Congo and his friends is, arguably, misleading to the point of
historically distorting. That is, the activities of the Indonesian military form no
part of his depictions of the massacres (Cribb 2014, 147; van Klinken 2014, 176;
5Wandita 2014, 168). The danger in this omission is that the film can be read as
implying that the mass killings were the work of criminal psychopaths, rather
than a campaign of extermination authorized and actively encouraged by a group
within the military aspiring to power. As Galuh Wandita suggests: “the film is in
danger of depicting the mass killings . . . as if it were the spontaneous works of
10mad men, the version of history that the Indonesian military promotes” (Wandita
2014, 168). Indeed, as Robert Cribb observes:
At a time when a growing body of detailed research on the killings has made clear
that the army played a pivotal role in the massacres, TAOK puts back on the agenda
the Orientalist notion that Indonesians slaughtered each other with a casual self-
15indulgence because they did not value human life. (Cribb 2014, 147)
In this way, the film constructs Indonesia as a gangster’s paradise, full of people
ignorant of their history, and leaves little room for Indonesians to contest these
claims. Indonesians on this view are as yet undemocratic, unenlightened, and in
need of the guiding hand of the caring outsider to achieve positive change (Dag
20Yngvesson cited in Dwyer [2014, 187]). As John Roosa sharply observes: “It is not
as if barbarism is casually accepted in Indonesia as an everyday matter and stran-
glings are no more shocking than the slicing of cabbages in the kitchen” (Roosa
2014, 180). On this basis the film “ultimately fails as a transformative intervention,
instead giving strength to the exclusion of activist voices from Indonesia’s political
25sphere and resurrecting colonial-era narratives of a barbaric ‘heart of darkness’
penetrable only by the civilizing eye of the Western camera” (Dwyer 2014, 184).
The survivors, their children, and their grandchildren have memories, have not
forgotten, but their memories do not always take on easily digestible testimonial
forms and the film does nothing to explore the possibility of other forms of testi-
30mony (Dwyer 2014, 187).
For these reasons, and despite it being uniquely conceived and executed, the
film lapses into an Orientalist account of Indonesia. As Laurie Sears notes, it is in-
conceivable that a film focused on aged Nazis, reminiscing about their slaughter
of Jews (and others) while interrogating Americans about their treatment of
35Indigenous American populations to justify their actions, would go unremarked
(see Sears 2014, 205–6). Would not a documentary that enabled service personnel
or military contractors to re-enact their activities at Guantanamo Bay or Abu
Ghraib without some sense of the broader political context generate dismay? That
TAOK primarily provokes responses about the events it depicts but not
40the broader historical claims it implies, suggests an overly passive acceptance of
some conventional Orientalist tropes about the Indonesian other. On my reading,
the film, while unique in conception and aesthetically rich, is not enabling of the
kind of political action necessary to redress the violence of the Indonesian state
(Dwyer 2014, 184). It is possible, therefore, that TAOK fails the key test of any docu-
45mentary film that negotiates trauma. That is, the purpose of such a film is to make
meaningful in the present the particular events documented, to preserve their mem-
ory and to provide an interpretation of history, while such bearing witness also needs
to be sensitive to, even therapeutic for, the traumatized (Winston 2012, 109). It is
far from clear to me that TAOK can make this claim.
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Conclusion
There can be no doubting that TAOK is a significant accomplishment in filmmak-
ing. It may be unique in the ways it addresses mass murder. However, my admira-
tion for its achievements is outweighed by a range of concerns about its depiction
5of Indonesia and Indonesians. Late in the film Oppenheimer returns Congo to
the rooftop where, earlier in the film, the latter had cheerfully demonstrated his
garroting technique. Upon return (and we have no way of knowing when in the
process of making this film the scene was shot), it is a far more somber Congo
who reminisces about his activities on that rooftop all those years ago. As he de-
10scribes what happened and expresses some sense of remorse, Congo begins vio-
lently dry-retching as if finally confronted by the monstrousness of his actions.
This may or may not be indicative of genuine sorrow and awareness on the part
of Congo. However, it is structured into the film in such a way that it appears as
though it is the film and filmmaker that have brought about change in the con-
15sciousness of the mass murderer, Congo. As my references to Indonesia specialists
throughout this article imply, I am not the only critic with concerns about the
ways the film locates the filmmaker as having acted politically and having made
change possible (see Dwyer [2014, 185–86]). That is, despite Oppenheimer’s
warm recognition of the many Indonesians who participated in the filmmaking
20but who are not named for fear of the ramifications for them and their families, it
is Oppenheimer’s presence in the film, and his subsequent advocacy on the part
of victims, that position Oppenheimer as the enabling political actor. Despite the
repression, despite the imposed silences, despite the state-sponsored erasure of its
violence from the formative moment of the contemporary Indonesian state, the
25film’s implication that it has restored speech, broken the silence, and recovered
memory needs to be treated with the utmost caution.
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